Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 33 | Number 5

Article 2

2006

Medicinal Marijuana and Palliative Care: Carving a
Liberty Interest Out of the Glucksberg Framework
Adam Hyatt

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
Part of the Accounting Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Adam Hyatt, Medicinal Marijuana and Palliative Care: Carving a Liberty Interest Out of the Glucksberg Framework , 33 Fordham Urb. L.J.
1345 (2006).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol33/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

HYATT_CHRISTENSEN

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

MEDICINAL MARIJUANA AND PALLIATIVE
CARE: CARVING A LIBERTY INTEREST OUT OF
THE GLUCKSBERG FRAMEWORK
Adam Hyatt *

INTRODUCTION
On August 15, 2002, Butte County deputy sheriffs and federal agents
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) arrived at Diane
Monson’s house with a search warrant and discovered six cannabis plants. 1
The deputies determined that Monson was a licensed user of medicinal
marijuana, and thus her use of the cannabis plants was lawful pursuant to
California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, 2 which protects from
criminal prosecution “patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and
use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a
physician.” 3 Following a three-hour standoff, however, the DEA agents
seized and destroyed Monson’s cannabis plants. 4
The DEA’s seizure was problematic for Monson because she suffers
*

J.D. candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor
Tracy Higgins for her ongoing advice.
1. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005). Cannabis plants may be processed
into marijuana, which is also commonly referred to as pot, weed, reefer, grass, etc. See Drug
Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drugs of Abuse (2005),
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/abuse/7-pot.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
2. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198. California is one of nine states that have permitted the
use of medicinal marijuana. The other states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada,
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. See STATE POLICIES DEP’T, MARIJUANA POLICY
PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF
ARREST 10 (2004), available at http://oldsite.mpp.org/pdf/sbs_report_2004.pdf.
3. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West
1996). The purpose of the Act is
[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and
has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s
health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer,
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any
other illness for which marijuana provides relief.
Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A).
4. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
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from a degenerative disease of the spine, which causes her “severe, chronic
back pain and constant painful muscle spasms.” 5 The intensity of her pain
is such that she is unable to work or sit down, and thus she is limited to
lying down. 6 Under the care of a Board-certified physician, Monson has
tried an array of prescription drugs, including muscle relaxants and antiinflammatories, but each has been ineffective as a painkiller or has
produced extreme side effects. 7 Medicinal marijuana, on the other hand,
significantly alleviates Monson’s pain and eradicates her muscle spasms
almost entirely. 8 Accordingly, her physician has concluded that medical
marijuana is the sine qua non of a successful treatment of her pain and
suffering. 9
Angel Raich is also afflicted with serious medical problems and uses
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to the recommendation of her
physician. 10 Prior to the DEA’s raid of Monson’s home, Raich had
enjoyed protection regarding her use of medicinal marijuana under the
Compassionate Use Act. 11 Raich’s ailments are both life-threatening and
painful. 12 In 1996, she became paralyzed and was restricted to a
wheelchair. 13 Raich’s physician had attempted to treat her with an array of
medications, but all proved to be ineffective or caused extreme and
When her physician told her that
“unacceptable” side effects.14
conventional medicine would not help, Raich attempted suicide. 15
Subsequently, her physician recommended that she use medicinal
marijuana, which significantly improved her medical condition and enabled
her to be more active. 16 Accordingly, her physician concluded that there is
no legal alternative to medical marijuana, and that without it her body

5. Brief for the Respondents at 10, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2004) (No. 031454), 2004 WL 2308766.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 4-5.
11. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200.
12. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 12. Her medical conditions include lifethreatening weight loss, nausea, severe chronic pain (from scoliosis, temporomandibular
joint dysfunction and bruxism, endometriosis, headaches, rotator cuff syndrome, and uterine
fibroid tumor causing severe dysmenorrheal), an episode of paralysis, post-traumatic stress
disorder, non-epileptic seizures, fibromyalgia, an inoperable brain tumor, multiple chemical
sensitivities, allergies, and asthma. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id. at 5-6.
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
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would deteriorate, hastening her death.17
Subsequent to the DEA’s seizure of Monson’s cannabis plants, Monson
and Raich brought suit against the United States Attorney General 18 and the
DEA, seeking to enjoin the federal government from enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 19 which makes it unlawful to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess marijuana, and does not
recognize an exception for medical use. 20 In their complaint, Monson and
Raich argued that the CSA, as applied to them, violated the Commerce
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the doctrine of medical
necessity. 21
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
disagreed and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The
court found that the government’s interest 22 “wane[d] in comparison with
the public interests enumerated by plaintiffs and by the harm that they
would suffer if denied medical marijuana,”23 but nonetheless concluded
that plaintiffs were not entitled to legal relief because they failed to
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.24
On appeal, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed and ordered the
district court to enter the preliminary injunction.25 The court held that
plaintiff-appellants had demonstrated a likelihood of success based on their
Commerce Clause argument. 26 The court also found that Monson and

17. Id.
18. At the time the action was brought, John Ashcroft was the Attorney General. By the
time the case reached the Supreme Court, Alberto R. Gonzales had become Attorney
General.
19. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
20. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A §§ 823, 841(a)(1) (West 2006). The CSA
places restrictions on controlled substances based on the schedule under which a particular
drug is categorized. Because a Schedule I drug, such as marijuana, is deemed to have “a
high potential for abuse” and “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United
States,” the only available exception for its legal use exists for government-approved
research projects. Id. §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(C), 823(f) (West 2006); United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001).
21. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).
22. More specifically, this governmental interest is the presumption of constitutional
validity of congressional legislation and the regulation of medicine by the FDA. Raich v.
Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003).
26. Id. at 1227.
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Raich would endure “significant hardship[s]”27 if denied the injunction and
that the government’s interests were “weak in comparison to the real
medical emergency facing” plaintiffs,28 but did not reach the substantive
due process claim or the medical necessity defense.
In Gonzales v. Raich, 29 which largely dealt with the issue of federalism,
the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and held that the
CSA was not an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause as
applied to the plaintiff-respondents. 30 Because the Ninth Circuit did not
reach respondents’ substantive due process claim or medical necessity
defense, the Court remanded the case to determine whether Monson and
Raich could succeed on these other avenues for judicial relief.31
This Comment will focus only on the substantive due process claim
available to the plaintiffs on remand. 32 More specifically, this Comment
will assess whether there is a right to palliative care. In Washington v.
Glucksberg, 33 which dealt with the right to assisted suicide, five Justices34
suggested that there may be a liberty interest in avoiding or mitigating
pain—even if it hastens death. Accordingly, the facts of Raich fit squarely
within the fundamental liberty interest question addressed in Glucksberg,
albeit with an additional hurdle over a statute illegalizing marijuana that is
backed by significant policy concerns.
A recent Harvard Law Review note 35 argued that “a law completely
banning the use of marijuana will, as applied to some patients, infringe
upon an array of fundamental rights, and that substantive due process
obliges” the courts to apply strict scrutiny to such a law. 36 The Comment
does not, however, assert that there is indeed a right to use last-resort
medical marijuana, but rather examines the burdens that the absolute anti-

27. It is relevant to note that the government did not dispute this. See id. at 1234.
28. Id. at 1235.
29. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
30. Id. at 2215.
31. Id.
32. For an interesting analysis of the medical necessity defense, see Andrew J. LeVay,
Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical
Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699 (2000). See also United States v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a defense to
manufacturing and distributing marijuana).
33. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
34. Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter all filed concurring
opinions.
35. Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process
Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985 (2005)
[hereinafter Last Resorts].
36. Id. at 1985.
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marijuana law has on “an array of fundamental rights rooted in both the
traditional 37 and the autonomy 38 theories of substantive due process.”39 It
goes only so far as to say that such a law “make[s] it substantially more
difficult to pursue these broader values by making it completely impossible
for patients to exercise their narrower fundamental rights,” and ends the
analysis at the strict scrutiny stage. 40
This Comment goes a step further by arguing that, in view of the Court’s
precedents, there is a right, subject to limitations, to use last-resort medical
marijuana. Part II examines substantive due process generally, as well as
the precedent relating to medical decision-making. This Part primarily
focuses on locating the right to palliative care, which was contemplated in
Glucksberg, and discusses how medicinal marijuana fits within that right.
Part III argues that there is indeed a fundamental right to palliative care and
assesses whether an absolute anti-marijuana law burdens this right to the
extent that the law is unconstitutional as applied to other cases. By
analyzing a range of different factual scenarios, this Part constructs a
framework to test the point at which the fundamental right is limited by
strict scrutiny balancing. Part III concludes by considering the future of the
medical decision-making spectrum of liberty interests articulated in
Glucksberg.

I. MEDICINAL MARIJUANA & THE ROAD TO PALLIATIVE CARE AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
This Part works through the doctrine of substantive due process in the
context of medical decision-making. In particular, this Part reconstructs
the framework established in Glucksberg and suggests that the Court in
Raich is headed in a direction as to preserve a fundamental right to
palliative care that protects use of medicinal marijuana.
A.

Modern Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence

Modern substantive due process precedent “forbids the government to
infringe upon certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests [protected by
Fourteenth Amendment] at all . . . unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”41 The Supreme Court has

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 2006.
Id.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). This reflects the language of the strict
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been cautious, however, when confronted with an opportunity to “expand
the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”42
Accordingly, to “break new ground” 43 within the doctrine, the Court has
required the claimed liberty to be fundamental.44
The traditional approach, 45 articulated in Glucksberg, characterizes a
right as fundamental when it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition . . . and . . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”46
Furthermore, “a careful description of the asserted right or liberty” is
necessary. 47
Recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,48 the Court recognized a second vehicle
for finding fundamental rights. This approach is premised on the notion of
autonomy 49 and “emphasizes self-definition as the core of constitutionally
protected liberty.” 50
Although both approaches are plausible, this Comment suggests that the
right to palliative care fits within the Glucksberg paradigm. At the same
time, however, because medical decision-making is inherently related to
individual choice, discussion of personal autonomy is inevitable.

B.

Medical Decision-Making & the Right to Refuse Treatment

The Supreme Court considered the notion of fundamental rights in the
medical decision-making context as early as the turn of the twentieth
century when it decided Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.51
In Jacobson, a criminal defendant argued that a state statute infringed upon

scrutiny balancing test. When a right is not deemed fundamental, the state’s action merely
needs to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
42. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125
(1992)).
43. Id.
44. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1986.
45. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 89 (2003).
46. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1986 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
47. Id.
48. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
49. See Post, supra note 45, at 97.
50. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1987.
51. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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his liberty by subjecting him to punishment for refusing to submit to a
compulsory vaccination.52 The Court rejected the defendant’s assertion
and upheld the statute because the state legislature passed it as a public
safety measure designed to stop the spread of disease. 53 The Court
concluded that the Constitution “does not import an absolute right in each
person to be . . . wholly freed from restraint” and that “[t]here are manifold
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good.” 54
Eighty-five years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the right
to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health. 55 Using the logic of Jacobson, the Court concluded, “a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment.” 56 This notion was premised on the common-law
informed consent rule, which supported the proposition that “even the
touching of one person by another without consent and without legal
justification was a battery.” 57 The Court noted, however, that locating a
fundamental right is merely the first step because ascertaining whether
one’s substantive due process has been violated then requires balancing
that fundamental right against the corresponding state interest.58 In this
case, the Court found that the liberty interest outweighed any state interest,
and thus “assume[d]” a competent person has “a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.” 59
Embedded in this right to refuse treatment is the notion of autonomy in
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. at 27.
54. Id. at 26. The idea of the “common good” (in this case, stopping spread of disease)
is equivalent to the “compelling state interest language” in modern substantive due process
doctrine. Accordingly, it can be said that there was indeed a liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment, but it was not strong enough to survive strict scrutiny. In other words,
Jacobson turned on the compelling state interest prong of the test, rather than the
“fundamental liberty” prong of the test. Id.
55. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The Court focused on this right in the context of both
mentally competent and mentally incompetent people. This Note does not consider the
rights of mentally incompetent people, nor the evidentiary requirements necessary to
terminate life support.
56. Id. at 278. At this time, however, the Court did not articulate a level of scrutiny or
define this right as “fundamental.” The Court later used this language in Glucksberg. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997).
57. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Id. Five justices expressly asserted that this includes the right to refuse food and
water to bring about death. For example, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan
contended there is “a fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and
hydration, which . . . is not outweighed by any interests of the State . . . .” Id. at 302
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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medical decision-making, or more simply, the right “to choose effective
medical treatment pursuant to a doctor’s recommendation.”60 Accordingly,
as Justice O’Connor asserted in her Cruzan concurrence, “[b]ecause our
notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due
Process Clause.” 61 In the context of a competent terminally ill patient then,
requiring life support or other forced medical treatment would “burden that
individual’s liberty interests as much as any state coercion.” 62
Of course, the holding in Cruzan cannot be directly applied to the facts
of Raich because the former concerns the right to refuse treatment, while
the case at bar concerns obtaining treatment. 63 Nonetheless, because both
cases fall under the broad umbrella of medical decision-making while
under the care of a physician, it may be logical that the Due Process Clause
also protects the right to palliative care even if such care hastens death.64
In this case, the Court would be following the autonomy trajectory
established in Lawrence by emphasizing self-definition as a significant
source of fundamental rights. 65
C.

Medical Decision-Making, Physician-Assisted Suicide & the
Future

Seven years after Cruzan, the Court confronted the controversial issue of
physician-assisted suicide in Glucksberg. 66 The plaintiff-respondents,
Washington physicians who treated terminally ill patients, sought a
declaration that Washington’s assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional on
its face. 67 In rejecting respondents’ facial challenge and holding that there
is no fundamental right to assisted suicide, the Court’s method of
constitutional interpretation seemed to be evolving as it introduced a more
pronounced doctrinal test for substantive due process analysis.68 The

60. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1995.
61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 288.
63. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1993.
64. See id. at 1995-98. At the same time, however, the common-law tradition draws a
line between action and inaction: while touching another without permission is considered
tortious conduct, failing to rescue another is not. See generally Jackson v. City of Joliet,
715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
66. The Court decided a companion case, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), at the
same time.
67. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997).
68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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Court’s methodology reflected an originalist ideology: it emphasized
history and legal tradition as the sources of liberties rather than emerging
norms, 69 and defined the asserted right more specifically (i.e. the right to
physician-assisted suicide instead of the more generally defined right to
personal autonomy in medical decision-making). 70
Although a patient’s decision to request lethal medication can be equated
to the decision to refuse treatment, the notion of assisted suicide as a
fundamental right is problematic under the Court’s test because there is no
legal tradition of condoning suicide. 71 In fact, “for over 700 years, the
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.” 72 Furthermore, antisuicide laws are not recent “innovations,” but rather are “longstanding
expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of
all human life.” 73 Accordingly, recognizing assisted suicide as a
constitutionally protected liberty interest would “reverse centuries of legal
doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of
almost every State.” 74
Glucksberg repudiates or limits the notion that narrowly defined rights
pertaining to medical decision-making are primarily established under a
broad personal autonomy justification. 75 Although self-determination and
physical control over one’s body are relevant to the inquiry, those interests
are trumped by history and legal tradition. Thus, the right to refuse
treatment assumed in Cruzan “was not simply deduced from abstract
concepts of personal autonomy,” but rather “[g]iven the common-law rule
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting
the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, [the Court’s]
assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation’s history and
constitutional traditions.” 76 Assisted suicide, on the other hand, though a
similarly personal decision, contradicts the legal tradition and is thus
outside the gamut of constitutionally protected liberties. 77
Because the Court concluded that physician-assisted suicide was not a
fundamental right, Washington’s anti-suicide law merely had to survive

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705.
See id. at 710.
See id.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 710.
Id. at 723.
See id. at 727.
Id. at 725.
Id.
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rational basis review. 78 In this case, the State easily satisfied this
requirement with a plethora of legitimate government interests in banning
assisted suicide, including the preservation of human life,79 combating
suicide as a disease, 80 protecting the integrity of the medical profession,81
protecting vulnerable groups, 82 and avoiding a slippery slope that could
lead to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. 83 Accordingly, the Court
upheld Washington’s statute, but also left the door open in the legislative
arena for the assisted suicide debate to continue.84
Although the law prevents facial challenges to the anti-suicide law, the
concurrences of five Justices left open the possibility of challenges relating
to a scenario in which a patient is restricted from obtaining palliative
care. 85 In particular, “a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and
who is experiencing great pain [should face] no legal barriers to obtaining
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to
the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.” 86 The Justices
also suggested that an as-applied challenge may also succeed when a
patient’s pain is so severe that it cannot be alleviated by medication.87 This
liberty interest is related not only to avoiding pain, but also to controlling
the end of one’s life with dignity. 88 In totality then, the Glucksberg

78. Id. at 728.
79. This is the same “unqualified interest” at the core of homicide laws. Id.
80. Suicide is a public-health problem that needs to be meticulously studied and treated.
Id. at 730.
81. Id. at 731.
82. The concern is that the poor, elderly, and disabled could be coerced into consenting
to assisted suicide toward the end of life. See id. at 731-32. This protection is also
necessary because assisted suicide could denigrate the notion that the disabled and
terminally ill can lead valuable lives. Id. at 732.
83. See id. at 732-33.
84. Id. at 735. Practically, this meant that assisted suicide was left to the political
process of each state. Accordingly, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 127.800-127.890 (West 2006), which legalized physician-assisted suicide subject to
certain limitations, remained good law. In fact, several months after Glucksberg was
decided, the Oregon law withstood a ballot measure to repeal it. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.
Ct. 904, 911 (2006). The Act then faced and withstood a challenge by the Attorney General.
Id. at 925-26. The case, one of the first heard by the newly composed Roberts Court, turned
on an issue of federal administrative law. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S.
Authority Over States on Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A1.
85. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 738 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 778
(joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in the judgment); id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
86. Id. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. Id.
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concurrences represent the notion that there is a fundamental right to
palliative care. Furthermore, they suggest that this liberty interest may
outweigh state interests, such as those articulated in Glucksberg, and
therefore survive strict scrutiny, even if the practical result is permitting
assisted suicide in limited situations.89
After Glucksberg, it became clear that the Court had created a
framework for analyzing a range of fundamental rights relating to medical
decision-making. On one end of the spectrum is the right to refuse
treatment, even if such a decision inevitably would lead to death. 90 On the
other end of the spectrum are two categories relating to suicide, which of
course includes physician-assisted suicide. The outermost category is the
decision to commit suicide when death is not imminent.91 A less extreme
category is the decision to commit suicide when death is imminent and the
end of life is physically painful. This category, which falls between the
right to refuse treatment and the right to suicide at will, infuses notions of
death with dignity and self-definition during the last days of life by
controlling the manner of death. The Court has drawn the line between the
right to refuse treatment and the right to commit suicide, but has signaled
openness to hearing an as-applied challenge in which the line could be
redrawn to define a right to assisted suicide as fundamental in very limited
circumstances. 92
In the center of the spectrum is the right to palliative care even if such
care hastens death. Whether the Court will deem this a fundamental right
is difficult to predict. On one hand, using medication prescribed by a
physician seems similar to refusing medical treatment in that it is a medical
decision over which the individual has autonomy. At the same time, the
physician plays a more affirmative role by recommending treatment, which
is closer to the administration of lethal drugs in assisted suicide.
Accordingly, the right to palliative care presents a tension that the Court
has not yet had a chance to resolve. Because Raich is not a case about
assisted suicide, however, it is not clear whether it fits squarely within the
Glucksberg scenario. On the other hand, the liberty interests of Monson
and Raich clearly parallel those at issue in Glucksberg.

89. See generally Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1993-95.
90. See supra Part I.B. Tied to this category, but moving more to the middle, is the
decision to discontinue treatment, which relates more to incompetent adults and is thus
outside the scope of this Note. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
91. One example of a situation where death is not imminent is if the individual has a
severe physical disability or depression.
92. Whether this would survive strict scrutiny, however, is another issue entirely.

HYATT_CHRISTENSEN

2/3/2011 10:20 PM

112

FORDHAM URB. L.J.
D.

[Vol. XXXIII

The Marijuana Curveball

Raich is further complicated by the fact that the case involves marijuana,
an illegal drug under the CSA. First, it is problematic to classify marijuana
as a form of palliative care, since there is tremendous disagreement as to
whether the substance has any therapeutic value. Second, because of its
illegality, marijuana adds an extra hurdle in the substantive due process
analysis.
1. The Marijuana Efficacy Issue
As Professor Tatiana Shohov points out, the question of whether
marijuana has therapeutic use for patients with conditions ranging from
migraines to terminal illnesses has been a topic of recent debate. 93 Less
controversial, however, is the notion that marijuana has both short- and
long-term adverse effects on the brain, the heart, the lungs, the immune
system, and on learning and social behavior.94 Notwithstanding its adverse
effects, marijuana, according to Shohov, has medicinal value. Shohov
provides scientific evidence proving that marijuana can provide relief from
nausea and increase appetite, reduce intraocular pressure, reduce muscle
spasms, and provide relief from chronic pain: it can thus treat symptoms of
cancer, AIDS, and multiple sclerosis. 95 This evidence has also entered the
legal arena and has given credibility to the great “number of health care
professionals and organizations [that] have concluded that the use of
marijuana may be appropriate for a small class of patients who do not
respond well to, or do not tolerate, available prescription drugs.” 96
On the other side of the controversy, the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”), which assesses the safety and effectiveness of drugs, has not
found a medicinal use for marijuana.97 Similarly, Congress determined

93. See generally MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA: POLICY, REGULATORY AND LEGAL
ISSUES (Tatiana Shohov ed., 2003).
94. Id. at 3-8.
95. Id. at 11, 23-39.
96. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
For more sources that conclude marijuana has medical use, see Marihuana Medical Access
Regulations, SOR/2001-227 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/ca/regu/sor2001227/; Select Committee On Science & Technology, Cannabis: The Scientific and Medical
Evidence,
1997-8,
H.L.
151-1,
at
§
8.2,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/151/15101.htm; In re
Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Drug Enforcement Admin. Sept. 6, 1988);
INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE (Janet E. Joy et al.
eds., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html.
97. MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 79. For an article on the FDA’s
regulation of pain management drugs, see Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation
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that marijuana has “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the
United States.” 98
Putting this debate aside, the empirical evidence admitted at trial in
Raich suggests, at the very least, that medicinal marijuana has therapeutic
value for both Monson and Raich. 99 Furthermore, both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit found that traditional medicine failed to help the
plaintiffs and that restricted access to marijuana would be unduly
burdensome. 100 Even the Supreme Court recognized that “despite a
congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid
therapeutic purposes.” 101 Accordingly, for the purposes of substantive due
process analysis, this Comment will assume arguendo that marijuana has
therapeutic value.
2. The Illegality Hurdle
Marijuana’s illegality under the CSA may create a problem in locating a
fundamental right. Of course, this depends entirely on whether the right is
framed at a broad or specific level of generality. 102 At a specific level of
generality (i.e. the right to use medicinal marijuana), finding a fundamental
right would be unlikely given the Nation’s history and legal tradition.
Thus, rational basis review would apply. 103 A recent Harvard Law Review
note points out, however, “the Court must not take such a myopic view of
the claimed right that it loses the sight of the values at stake.” 104
Accordingly, defining the right in Raich narrowly as the right to use
medicinal marijuana is analogous to the error committed by the Bowers v.
Hardwick 105 Court in defining the claimed right as the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. 106 That is, “[t]he mistake lies in viewing the claimed
right as identical to the conduct that the law prohibits,” which in turn
ignores significant values underlying the claimed right. 107 At a broad level
of generality, however, there is concern that “the scope of substantive due
process becomes limitless.” 108 This would preclude the right from being
of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003).
98. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(1)(B) (West 2006).
99. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
101. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005).
102. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
103. Id. at 570 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
104. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1988.
105. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
106. See Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1988.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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framed as one of personal autonomy in medical decision-making. 109
Framing it as a right to palliative care, then, is neither too broad nor too
narrow, and seems to be most consistent with Lawrence, Cruzan, and the
concurrences of Glucksberg.
If the right is properly framed as the right to palliative care, the legal
status of marijuana enters the analysis at the point of determining whether
the state interest is compelling. The government has an undeniable interest
in eradicating drugs from society, which is highlighted by codified antidrug policy in the CSA. 110 This governmental interest dates back to 1969
when President Richard Nixon launched a national “war on drugs.” 111
Thereafter, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970, 112 which includes the CSA within Title II. In
passing the Act, Congress’s objectives were “to conquer drug abuse and to
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”113
In particular, Congress sought to “prevent diversion [of legitimate drugs]
into illegal channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the
traffic of illicit drugs.” 114
More specifically, marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, in part
because of its high potential for abuse.115 Illustrative of this is the fact that
marijuana is used more in the United States than any other illegal drug,
with over twelve million Americans, age twelve and over, using the drug at
least once a month in 2001. 116 This statistic is troubling because of the
scientific evidence documenting the health risks associated with the use of
marijuana. 117 Furthermore, many scientists adhere to the notion that
marijuana is a gateway drug that may lead to the use of more dangerous

109. See id. at 1988-89.
110. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 236 (1970).
111. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005); see also DAVID F. MUSTO &
PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL 60 (2002).
112. 84 Stat. 1236. Prior to that, Congress passed legislation, such as the Harrison
Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970), and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970), which did not illegalize marijuana but
instead established harsh regulations that had the practical effect of curtailing the market for
marijuana. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2202.
113. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203.
114. Id. at 2201.
115. Id. at 2204.
116. MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 1-2.
117. Id. at 42. The long-term risks associated with chronic use include damage to the
respiratory system, cardiovascular system, the immune system, and the reproductive system.
Id. In addition, there are many possible short-term complications users of marijuana may
confront. The number of hospital emergency room visits induced by or relating to the use of
marijuana increased fifteen percent from 96,426 in 2000 to 110,512 in 2001. Id. at 2.
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substances. 118
Accordingly, it is clear that the government has an interest in curtailing
the use of marijuana in the United States. Because the medication in this
case is illegal, Raich is an excellent test case for the right to palliative care.
In balancing the liberty interest against the government’s interest in this
case, it is significant to note that the latter remains fixed. Conversely, one
individual claiming the right to palliative care might have a stronger liberty
interest than another. This notion comes to fruition in Raich because
Monson’s interest is alleviating severe pain, while Raich’s interest is not
only treating her pain but also staying alive. Because legislation such as
the Compassionate Use Act permitted the use of marijuana for medicinal
purposes for an array of medical conditions, a spectrum of liberty interests
is necessary to determine where to draw the line at the strict scrutiny
balancing stage—thereby distinguishing constitutional and unconstitutional
government intrusion.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR MEDICINAL MARIJUANA:
LIMITED USES SUBSUMED BY THE RIGHT TO PALLIATIVE CARE
This Part contends that the Glucksberg framework applies to the liberty
interest asserted by plaintiffs in Raich. Moreover, in light of the Court’s
substantive due process precedents in the medical decision-making context,
this Part argues that the use of marijuana for medical purposes is within a
sphere of constitutional protection, subject to limitations, when it falls
within the right to palliative care. This section suggests an approach to
evaluating individual circumstances with a view to distinguishing palliative
care from physician-assisted suicide, which the Court in Glucksberg
declined to include within the scope of individual liberty protected by the
Constitution.
A.

Applying Glucksberg To Raich

In the broadest sense, the Glucksberg framework applies to the facts of
Raich because of the assertion of a liberty interest in the medical decisionmaking context. The cases clearly differ, however, in that the liberty
interest at issue in Glucksberg was physician-assisted suicide, while the
plaintiffs in Raich are seeking to protect their ability to receive palliative
care. Furthermore, because the Court emphasizes an originalist ideology
when locating rights, the liberty interests asserted in these cases conflict.
That is, the United States clearly does not have a history or legal tradition

118. Id. at 42.
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of condoning suicide. 119 On the other hand, the common law protected
individuals from bodily encroachment by others because of notions of
personal autonomy. 120 The Court in Cruzan pointed to this tradition as the
justification for a right to refuse treatment, even if the underlying
motivation of the decision was to cause death.121 An argument can be
made that opting for lethal medication is analogous to refusing treatment
because both lead to death, but there is a significant distinction between the
two options. In refusing treatment, the underlying objective may be to die,
but the decision is still a step removed from the result that will ultimately
occur. 122 Conversely, in the case of physician-assisted suicide, the decision
is directly linked to the result.
The right to palliative care should be viewed as an extension of this
logic. Palliative medication is more akin to refusing treatment than opting
for physician-assisted suicide, because there is still a gap between the
decision to use a pain-alleviating medication that will hasten death and
death itself. Ergo, in opting for palliative care, only the objective to lessen
pain may be assumed. Furthermore, similar to the right to refuse treatment,
the decision to choose a treatment is both supported by tradition and
notions of personal autonomy. When a competent adult seeks medical
advice for a particular illness or condition, although the physician may
recommend various treatments and discuss the possible outcomes and side
effects, ultimately the individual is autonomous in selecting the course of
action. Out of traditional respect for the doctor-patient relationship, the
government stays outside the walls of the physician’s office.123 This is not
to say that the physician’s office is beyond the law; clearly such a rationale
would be a slippery slope in the same manner that an absolute right to
privacy in the bedroom would have been in Lawrence. Rather, absent a
compelling government interest, a government intrusion would offend
one’s liberty. Accordingly, the presumption should favor the liberty
interest of the patient, thereby placing the burden of proving a compelling
interest on the government at the strict scrutiny balancing stage. 124 When a

119. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
120. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
121. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
122. And there may be a significant passage of time between the decision to refuse
treatment (or food and hydration) and death. See NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG.,
ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION & END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING (2005), available at
http://www.caringinfo.org/files/public/QA_Artificial_Nutrition_booklet.pdf.
123. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 341 (2006).
124. For example, it should be presumed that an individual who needs to have a cavity
filled in by a dentist should have the option to undergo the procedure with Novocain. If the
government wanted to restrict this option, it would have the burden of proving a compelling
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treatment is palliative in nature, notions of physical freedom and selfdetermination strengthen the individual’s liberty interest. For the state to
deny a patient in great pain the ability to ameliorate her condition would be
an “incursion” just as “repugnant” as forcing treatment upon that patient.125
Based on these arguments and the concurrences of five justices in
Glucksberg, it is probable that the Court will determine that the right to
palliative care is fundamental.
Although the right to palliative care applies to both plaintiffs, Monson’s
and Raich’s situations should be viewed as distinct cases at the strict
scrutiny balancing stage because their liberty interests are different.
Monson’s liberty interest represents the right to palliative care in the
manner contemplated by the Glucksberg concurrences. That is, Monson
requires medicinal marijuana to treat the severe pain and muscle spasms
she experiences as symptoms of her degenerative spine condition.126
Because her physician has concluded that medicinal marijuana is the only
drug that can effectively treat her symptoms, it represents her last resort at
palliative care.127 Raich’s interest, albeit also partly to ease her physical
pain and discomfort, is stronger, since her use of medicinal marijuana is
predominantly for the purpose of preserving her life. Cannabis is her last
resort; without it her body would deteriorate, rapidly causing her death.128
Accordingly, at the strict scrutiny balancing stage, because the
government’s interest remains constant, and the outcome turns on the
strength of the fundamental right, it is possible for the Court to reach a
favorable result for Raich and an unfavorable result for Monson. In other
words, the Court could conclude that Raich’s interest in staying alive
outweighs the government’s interest in fighting the war on drugs, but that
Monson’s interest in reducing her pain does not.
Despite this possibility, it seems likely that both Raich and Monson have
sufficiently strong liberty interests to render the anti-marijuana law
unconstitutional as applied to them. 129 But this begs the question: where
should the line be drawn, separating permissible and impermissible uses of
medicinal marijuana as a form of palliative care? After all, the
Compassionate Use Act bestows the right to obtain and use marijuana for
medical purposes for “the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which

anti-Novocain interest.
125. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
126. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
127. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 7.
128. See id. at 5.
129. See infra Part II.A.1-2.
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marijuana provides relief.” 130 The Act indicates that there are many
medical uses for marijuana, but surely not all subsets fall into an area of
constitutional protection. Consequently, a spectrum clearly establishing a
limit is necessary to avoid a slippery slope dilemma. Furthermore, as a
caveat to constitutional protection, the use of medicinal marijuana should
be a last resort for treating a particular medical condition. In other words, a
plaintiff claiming that the use of medicinal marijuana is constitutionally
protected shall have the burden of proving that traditional forms of
medicine have failed and that medical marijuana is the only effective
treatment. Furthermore, the plaintiff must have first attempted an
exhaustive inventory of traditional medications pursuant to the care of a
physician before turning to marijuana as a last resort.
The following spectrum is a range of factual scenarios relating to the use
of medicinal marijuana, in which the level of constitutional protection
weakens as the medical condition becomes less “serious.” 131
1. Medical Conditions That Threaten Life
For a patient with a life-threatening medical condition such as Raich,
medicinal marijuana is not only palliative but actually prevents the body
from deteriorating. 132 In such cases, medical marijuana is used to prolong
the life of the patient: thus the liberty interest is at the height of
constitutional protection. First, from a textual perspective, the right to life
interest is specifically articulated in both the Declaration of Independence
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 133 Second,
our legal tradition elevates the life interest over all other rights, which is
most clearly expressed in homicide laws. 134 Third, avoiding death seems
to represent the apex of personal autonomy because it relates to bodily
integrity and self-definition. Finally, the life interest seems to be in accord
with the substantive due process doctrine. In Glucksberg, the preservation

130. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West
1996).
131. By no means is this a thorough list of the medical conditions that medicinal
marijuana can treat. For a more thorough list see AMA Council on Scientific Affairs,
http://www.amaMedical
Marijuana,
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13625.html#major_proposed_medical_uses (last visited Aug. 31,
2006).
132. This could apply to patients diagnosed with cancer or patients experiencing AIDS
“wasting.” See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 5.
133. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV § 1.
134. Washington v. Gluckersberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997); James A. Alesandro,
Physician-Assisted Suicide & New York Law, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 820, 923 (1994).
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of life was the predominant impetus behind the Court’s holding at both
stages of the substantive due process inquiry. 135 At the liberty interest
stage, the Court rejected the notion of a fundamental right to assisted
suicide because “of the States’ [longstanding] commitment to the
protection and preservation of human life.”136 At the state interest stage,
the Court similarly found the States’ ban on assisted suicide as rationally
related to the “unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.”137
Accordingly, because patients such as Raich are trying to prolong life, the
palliative care interest is the exact antithesis of the concerns echoed in
Glucksberg. After rejecting a right to physician-assisted suicide on the
basis of this interest in the preservation of life, to hold that Raich’s liberty
interest falls short of the government’s interest in curtailing the marijuana
trade would seemingly conflict with a right enumerated in the Constitution,
the Nation’s history and legal tradition, notions of personal autonomy, and
the Court’s precedent.
2. Medical Conditions Associated With Severe Pain
Although the right to palliative care is not as strong as an interest in
preserving life, patients such as Monson, who use medicinal marijuana to
reduce severe pain, should fall within the sphere of constitutional
protection. Monson’s condition restricts her ability to move around, stand,
or sit, because the intensity of her pain completely incapacitates her.138 In
other words, her condition has rendered it impossible for her to lead a
normal life. When treated with medicinal marijuana, however, her
symptoms are significantly reduced. 139 Accordingly, the anti-marijuana
law offends her personal autonomy because it impedes both her physical
freedom and her ability to define herself. At the strict scrutiny balancing
stage, this personal autonomy interest outweighs the government’s antidrug interest for two reasons. One, both the short- and long-term health
risks associated with marijuana are moot because she is already battling a
condition that is severely worse than the possible conditions she may
possibly face due to the drug. Moreover, her physician concluded that
medicinal marijuana does not cause Monson unacceptable side effects,
unlike the many other medications she has tried. 140 Two, it seems
inequitable for the government to make patients such as Monson martyrs of
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See infra Parts II.A.2.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
Id. at 728.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 5-6.
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the government’s perpetual war on drugs.
In other words, the
government’s interest is just not compelling enough for the absolute antidrug law to survive strict scrutiny, as applied to plaintiffs with such
significant liberty interests at stake.
Of course, such a holding inevitably creates both institutional concerns
and a slippery slope problem because there can be no bright line rule to
distinguish between “severe” pain and “ordinary” pain. Nevertheless, the
task of weighing the liberty interest against the government’s interest is not
unmanageable. 141 Courts should execute a cost-benefit analysis, in which
the inquiry turns on evidence presented by the plaintiff’s physician. In
assessing this evidence, courts should consider factors such as whether the
pain is chronic or sporadic and whether or not the pain causes physical
immobility.
3. Other Medical Conditions: When Pain Is Not “Severe”
The other medical conditions permitting the use of medicinal marijuana
under the Compassionate Use Act that are beneath the “severe” pain
benchmark, such as migraines, glaucoma, and anorexia, are outside the
scope of constitutional protection.142 This is not to say that these
conditions—from which millions of Americans suffer—are not serious, but
rather that the liberty interests associated with them do not outweigh the
government’s anti-drug interest. Although these conditions emphasize
personal autonomy, they do not reach the point at which the patient’s life is
completely in the hands of the medical condition, as is the case for
individuals such as Raich and Monson.
Furthermore, with regard to institutional concerns, this seems to be an
appropriate point to draw the line in order to keep the analysis from
becoming unwieldy. For example, if a patient who suffered from migraines
once a week was deemed to have a liberty interest strong enough to bring
her use of medicinal marijuana into a sphere of constitutional protection,
the Court would surely be creating a slippery slope. This decision would
open the door for the line to be pushed even further: subsequent plaintiffs
would claim a similar right to palliative care because of migraines suffered
monthly, yearly, and so on. Accordingly, for the doctrine to have any
value, the line must be drawn clearly below the “severe” pain echelon—
that is, the point at which the pain unduly restricts one from leading a
141. This task is arguably comparable to assessing the amount of pain a plaintiff has
suffered in order to award monetary damages in a tort action.
142. See Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A)
(West 1996). Similarly, this excludes the “any other illness for which marijuana provides
relief” part of the Compassionate Use Act from being constitutionally protected. Id.
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normal life.
B.

The Glucksberg Spectrum Of Liberty Interests: Drawing A Line
That Excludes Physician-Assisted Suicide

In revisiting the spectrum of liberty interests relating to medical
decision-making set forth in Glucksberg, it is clear that the right to
palliative care is fundamental. The facts of Raich provide the Court with
an opportunity to articulate the strength of this liberty interest by focusing
on as-applied challenges to the absolute anti-marijuana law. And it seems
that in the cases of Raich and Monson, access to medicinal marijuana as
integrated within the right to palliative care is sufficiently “fundamental” to
outweigh the government’s policy objectives that underlie the CSA. What
Raich does not do, however, is assess what could be a thin line between
palliative care hastening death and physician-assisted suicide. Although
marijuana poses health risks, this type of drug is not what the authors of the
Glucksberg concurrences had in mind when they discussed the right to
palliative care. 143 Rather, the five justices were referring to a drug, which
while lessening the patient’s pain, simultaneously accelerated death.144
And as previously mentioned, such cases should qualify as a fundamental
right because the act of administering palliative medication that hastens
death is a step removed from choosing death itself.145 Moreover, at the end
of life, the personal autonomy interest increases as notions of selfdetermination and dignity become more prevalent. 146
A final issue outside the scope of Raich, alluded to in the Glucksberg
concurrences, is the issue of physician-assisted suicide in a situation in
which the patient’s pain is so severe that it cannot be alleviated by
medication. Recently, this contemplated situation came to fruition at
Memorial Hospital in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. 147 The hospital’s electricity was shut down, causing the
temperature to rise inside the hospital and severely ill patients to be
disconnected from life-sustaining medical equipment.148 After the storm,
Louisiana’s attorney general launched an investigation into possible mercy
killings (killing patients that were too sick to survive the hurricane) by

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791-92 (1997).
Id.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See Beth Musgrave, 73 Hospital Workers Facing Mercy-Killings Subpoenas, MIAMI
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, at A9.
148. Id.
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doctors and nurses. 149 In an extreme context such as this, the question
should be whether the constitutional limit excluding assisted suicide
encroaches too far on an individual’s personal autonomy. While such a
case would be a difficult decision for the Court to make given its reliance
on originalist ideology, the Court would not find a right to assisted suicide
even under such a rare factual scenario. Ultimately, the Court would fear
that opening the door just a crack would blur the distinction between what
is permissible and impermissible under the Constitution. Moreover, the
slippery slope concern in finding an assisted-suicide exception is quite
deleterious to society as a result of the government’s profound interest in
the preservation of human life, protecting vulnerable groups, and avoiding
the road to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.150

CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that the right to palliative care is a logical
outgrowth of Glucksberg in light of both the Court’s originalist approach
and the emerging emphasis on personal autonomy within substantive due
process jurisprudence. For a small number of patients who are terminally
ill or living with chronic, severe pain, such as Diane Monson and Angel
Raich, however, the only effective life-sustaining or palliative treatment
comes in the form of medicinal marijuana. Despite the illegality of
marijuana and the government’s corresponding policy, such use of
medicinal marijuana falls under the umbrella of constitutional protection,
because the government’s interest in an absolute anti-drug law does not
outweigh the liberty interest in staying alive or defining one’s own
existence. At the same time, access to medicinal marijuana for patients
with symptoms treatable by the drug is not unqualified, and is limited by
both the severity of the patient’s condition and proof that traditional forms
of medicine are ineffective. Finally, this Comment asserts that despite
finding a right to palliative care—even if it hastens death—the line should
be not be extended further to include assisted suicide within the sphere of
constitutional protection. This is the case even in extreme circumstances
due both to compelling government interests and the risk of the doctrine
becoming unworkable.

149. Id.
150. See supra notes 79, 82-83 and accompanying text.

